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Signs and C.S. Lewis: The Meaning of Meaning and the Value of Film
Charlie W. Starr

Lovers of C.S. Lewis frequently say his power as
a fantasist and apologist is his understanding of the
importance of imagination in human knowing—its
emotional impact, experiential quality, intimate
connection to both faith and our longing for
encounters with mystery.
Behind Lewis’s
understanding of imagination is his awareness that
meaning precedes language and therefore truth.
Lewis unlocks the power of art, myth, and language
in realizing that meaning is connection and that many
“meanings” are experiential, intuitive, imaginative,
and semi-conscious. The implications of Lewis’s
theory of meaning on the medium of film are several
and best exemplified in the last three of M. Night
Shyamalan’s movies, The Sixth Sense, Unbreakable,
and Signs.
The Problem of Meaning
Two passages in Lewis are foundational to our
understanding his definition of meaning. The first of
these appears in The Last Battle, describing the New
Narnia, the heavenly one: “The new one was a deeper
country: every rock and flower and blade of grass
looked as if it meant more. I can’t describe it any
better than that: if you ever get there you will know
what I mean” (213). The most significant part of the
passage is the line, “as if it meant more.” But what
exactly does that mean? A quality of the new Narnia
which contrasts it with the old is its apparent increase
in size, but this turns out not to be so much an
increase in physical size as in the largeness of its
being (the new Narnia looks more “like the real
thing”[210]). And as being increases, so does
meaning. A start perhaps, but hardly a definition.

The second significant passage occurs in
“Bluspels and Flalansferes,” an essay of literary
theory in which Lewis considers the problem of
literal versus figurative or metaphorical language:
[I]t must not be supposed that I am in any
sense putting forward the imagination as the
organ of truth. We are not talking of truth,
but of meaning: meaning which is the
antecedent condition both of truth and
falsehood, whose antithesis is not error but
nonsense. I am a rationalist. For me, reason
is the natural organ of truth; but imagination
is the organ of meaning. Imagination,
producing new metaphors or revivifying old,
is not the cause of truth, but its condition.
(Rehabilitations 157-58)
This paragraph, unfortunately, is more of an
addendum to “Bluspels,” and thus there is no
sufficient context for knowing exactly what Lewis
means when he says imagination is the “organ of
meaning” and meaning is the “antecedent” to truth.
To understand Lewis’s definition of meaning and
how it impacts a discussion on film requires two
explorations, one in a problem of epistemology that
was central to Lewis thinking, and the other a careful
analysis of Lewis’s theory of myth.
The Epistemological Dilemma
We begin with Lewis’s epistemological problem:
the abstract/concrete or thinking versus experiencing
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dilemma. Lewis noted that, while experience allows
concrete knowing that is intense and immediate but
critically vague, reason allows careful contemplation
that is clear, but abstract and time bound. How can
reality be known with the clarity of reason but
without the space of abstraction, of separation? And
how can reality be experienced intensely but with a
knowing that is complete? (“Myth Became Fact” 6566). Humor exemplifies the dilemma: we can laugh
at a joke or think about why it was funny. We cannot
do both at the same time. Why is this a problem?
Lewis’s own example is of pain. He thinks to
himself, ‘If only my tooth would stop hurting, I could
write another chapter for my book about pain. But
when do we really know pain except when
experiencing it in all its intensity?’ Lewis says that
myth is a partial solution to this problem.
Lewis makes a number of distinctions in his
“Myth Became Fact” article that will facilitate our
understanding. First he makes a connection between
“myth” and “reality” and a separation of “reality”
from “truth”: “What flows into you from the myth is
not truth but reality (truth is always about something,
but reality is that about which truth is)”(66). Reality
(or fact) is what is; truth is a proposition about fact.
A little later in the paragraph Lewis notes that myth
is not “like direct experience” and in the following
paragraph he asserts that myth “comes down from the
heaven of legend and imagination to the earth of
history.” Myth serves as a bridge across the chasm
separating heaven from earth. Next, Lewis describes
our earthly existence as a “valley of separation”
(66n). He suggests, “Myth is the mountain whence
all the different streams arise which become truths
down here in the valley; in hac valle abstractionis”
(66). What is Lewis saying about reality in this
metaphor? In Mere Christianity Lewis suggests there
are different kinds of reality: the descriptive facts and
the prescriptive ones (14-19). “Myth Became Fact”
is here revealing kinds of interconnected realities: the
reality we experience on earth, the cognitive
experience of making abstract statements of truth
about that reality, and the experience of a
transcendent something (a higher reality, a myth-like
heavenly realm) in mythic stories.
In summary, myth reveals heavenly reality not
earthly experience (except once, says Lewis, in the
Incarnation); truth is born of concrete myth, but truth
is abstract statements about reality here in the fallen
world of abstraction, “the valley of separation”;
so any statement of truth we get out of myth is an
abstraction as well. Now how to draw all of this
together?

The answer can be found in The Great Divorce.
A ghostly man who has a passion for inquiry, (though
not for actually finding any truth) is visiting the
outskirts of heaven. There he meets an old friend
who has moved beyond the ghostly stage to full
presence, full being in heaven. The glorified man is
there to invite the ghost to go further in. But the
ghost refuses unless certain guarantees are met,
especially “an atmosphere of free inquiry” (43). The
glorified man tells his friend he will find no such
thing; he will find final answers. The ghost responds
that there is “something stifling about the idea of
finality” to which the other replies, “You think that,
because hitherto you have experienced truth only
with the abstract intellect. I will bring you where you
can taste it like honey and be embraced by it as by a
bridegroom” (43). Thus, in Lewis’s vision, what can
only be an abstract idea on earth is concrete reality in
heaven.
When one leaves the valley of abstraction (our
fallen world) for the mountain of myth (the heavenly
realm), abstraction and separation disappear as what
become abstract truths here in the valley are followed
to their concrete mythic sources on the mountaintop.
There is, therefore, no place along the stream where
one may stop and say, “here is truth but there is
myth.”
The separation no longer exists.
Experiencing and thinking simply become knowing.
But how does
understanding Lewis’s
Epistemology help us define meaning? First answer:
Meaning can be abstract language statements. But it
can also be concrete and can precede language. Look
at “Myth Became Fact” again:
I am trying to understand something very
abstract indeed—the fading, vanishing of
tasted reality as we try to grasp it with the
discursive reason. Probably I have made
heavy weather of it. But if I remind you,
instead, of Orpheus and Eurydice, how he
was suffered to lead her by the hand but,
when he turned round to look at her, she
disappeared, what was merely a principle
becomes imaginable. You may reply that
you never till this moment attached that
‘meaning’ to that myth. Of course not. You
are not looking for an abstract ‘meaning’ at
all. If that was what you were doing the
myth would be for you no true myth but a
mere allegory. You were not knowing, but
tasting; but what you were tasting turns out
to be a universal principle. The moment we
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state this principle, we are admittedly back
in the world of abstraction. It is only while
receiving the myth as a story that you
experience the principle concretely.” (66)
Lewis is saying that when we take a meaning out of a
myth we turn it into an abstract truth statement, an
idea. When we leave the meaning in the myth and do
not try to turn it into language statements, the
meaning remains a concrete experience. In myth,
ideas can be experienced as concrete thought.
Concrete Thought
Imagine a line on a chalkboard representing a
spectrum. At one end of the line appears the word
“Abstract,” and the other end the word “Concrete.”
The instructor applies these kinds of knowing to the
definition of a man. Thus, at the abstract end of the
spectrum is written a dictionary definition of a man,
followed by a poetical expression of a man, a
photograph of a man, and, at the concrete end of the
spectrum, the instructor himself standing beneath the
line:
Abstract
A man (male
gender
of the
species) is a bipedal
primate
capable of speech.

Concrete
“What a piece of
work is a man,
how noble in
reason,
how
infinite
in
faculties
. . .” (Hamlet
2.2.292-93)

Photograph

The
Instructor
himself

Nowhere in this spectrum do we yet see “concrete
thought.” Even the photograph perceived in the
imagination is an abstraction of the real man, despite
its close approximation to the concrete reality. But
where in this spectrum do we fit Tolkien’s hobbits?
Admittedly hobbits are like people, a version of the
human, but in Tolkien’s myth they are not people,
and therefore they are not abstractions of anything.
Hobbits are concrete realities; they are real imaginary
objects, that is, concrete objects of thought. When
our minds turn to hobbits, we both think about and
experience them at the same time.
A fine example in film of thinking which is
experientially immediate yet has the clarity of
reasoned thought occurs at the ending of The Sixth
Sense. The protagonist, a child psychiatrist played by
Bruce Willis, has helped a small boy who literally
sees the dead to deal with his special gift. But when
he tries to restore his own troubled relationship with
his wife, he experiences a brilliantly edited
“eucatastrophe” (to borrow Tolkien’s term). At the
moment the hero realizes he is dead, the audience is
presented a montage of fleeting images from
throughout the film that cause us to remake its

meaning in an instant. New knowledge arises with
the clarity of reason, but the speed and intensity of
direct experience. Those who have seen the film can
likely describe the experience thusly: “When I first
saw it, I thought I was watching one kind of movie;
when I got to this key point of revelation in the film, I
reconstructed it in an instant—it happened so fast that
I could not immediately put it in words, but I knew
and knew it completely.” This is an experience of
concrete thought. In myth and film, meaning is often
communicated with the clarity of reason, the intensity
of experience, and without abstract language. One
might respond, “But language is used in The Sixth
Sense scene.” Yes, but in it the language does not
have the same effect. It is more like sounds than
words; the concepts recalled come back to us in an
instant, like solid objects.
We are now positioned to make sense of Lewis’s
“Bluspels and Flalansferes” essay. When we receive
myth as story, we are experiencing a principle
concretely. Only when we put the experience into
words does the principle become abstract. But if we
can know a principle either concretely or by
abstraction, then meaning can be either concrete or
abstract.
This agrees with the statement in
“Bluspels” that meaning is the necessary antecedent
to truth (157).
Some meanings are abstract
propositions—truth statements. But there are other
kinds of meanings which can only be apprehended in
the imagination which thinks experientially. Such
meanings, the kind we get in myth and film for
example, come prior to abstraction and apart from
language.
What then is meaning? For Lewis, meaning is
connection, the perception of a relationship. If we
look further at Lewis’s theory of myth, this definition
will become more clear.
Myth and Film
Myth is language without language—a mode of
languaging in form. Myth is a communication which
is not in the words used to communicate it but in the
form of the myth itself. Lewis explains this in his
introduction to George MacDonald: An Anthology:
We all agree that the story of Balder is a
great myth, a thing of inexhaustible value.
But of whose version—whose words—are
we thinking of when we say this? For my
own part, the answer is that I am not
thinking of anyone’s words. No poet, as far
as I know or can remember, had told this
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story supremely well. I am not thinking of
any particular version of it. If the story is
anywhere embodied in words, that is almost
an accident. What really delights and
nourishes me is a particular pattern of
events, which would equally delight and
nourish if it had reached me by some
medium which involved no words at all—
say by a mime, or a film (26-27).
Myth communicates meaning apart from language.
And the same thing can be said for film.
In “On Fairy-Stories,” Tolkien rejects the idea
that myth is a “disease of language” and argues
instead that the opposite is more the case (The
Tolkien Reader 48). Shyamalan argues a similar
point in his film Unbreakable. There he sees
language as originating in pictures. Says the expert
in comic art: “I believe comics are a last link to an
ancient way of passing on history. The Egyptians
drew on walls. Countries all over the world still pass
on knowledge through pictorial forms. I believe
comics are a form of history that someone,
somewhere, felt or experienced.” Though we may not
think much of comic books revealing the hidden
nature of the universe, Shyamalan is making a point
that can be verified and is so by Lewis’s good friend
Owen Barfield whose book Poetic Diction influenced
Lewis’s epistemology greatly.
In Unbreakable, Night offers a theory of myth,
of a concrete picture language that precedes modern
language forms in which sign abstracts the signified.
The image form, surviving in a kind of collective
human unconscious, intrudes itself into contemporary
culture through comic art. What it reveals is an
archetypal pattern of the hero, Joseph Campbell’s
“monomyth.” Night further intuits a quality of
communicating which Barfield uncovers in his Poetic
Diction (45-92). A careful study of linguistic history
reveals that a strong distinction between sign and
signified, between the literal and the figurative, is
new to human thinking. For people before the
modern era (even up through the medieval period), to
name a thing was to invoke it; speech had physical
consequences in the world; words were what they
signified; metaphorical meanings were possible
because their connective representation was in some
way literal. Film resonates with Barfield’s view of
past language. What it says is what it is, and what is
shows is what it means. In the past, words were more
like pictures, in fact more like physical actions.
The connection between myth and film is clear.
Film is a mode of languaging which communicates
to us like a physical action, as a concrete experience,

and it is able to do so either without language or by
converting language into experiential form. An
example of film communicating as form without
language can be seen in Shyamalan’s most recent
film, Signs. Near the end of the film, the family has
boarded up its windows and doors in fear of an
eminent alien attack. As the attack begins, they
realize they have left the dog outside to fend for
itself. The family stares at a wall in the family room.
Outside the dog is barking. The camera slowly
zooms in on the wall. The barking becomes a frenzy,
then the growling that accompanies fighting and
biting, then the whimper of injury, and finally
silence. We never see beyond the family room wall,
but we, without words, what has happened to the dog.
The Crisis of Meaning
Barfield and Lewis both say words were more
like picture, like physical actions in the past. What
happened?
Lewis proposes that an increasing
distinction between literal and figurative meanings,
between sign and signified, between word as object
and abstraction is ultimately traceable to the fall. He
describes our world in times closer to the fall when
the “Earth itself was more like an animal . . . And
mental processes were much more like physical
actions” (That Hideous Strength 284). It was a time
when “matter and spirit were, from our modern point
of view, confused” (285).
Lewis says that a
separation (between spirit and matter and between
literal and figurative) has increased because we have
viewed the world with an increasingly materialistic
bias (in English Literature in the Sixteenth Century
[3-4]). Lewis predicts an end to the separation in an
eschatological vision of heaven and earth coming
together in which fact an myth are “remarried” and
literal and metaphorical thinking come “rushing
together” again (Miracles 211-12). Until then, myth
is the means Lewis recognized by which we manage
to experience the fullness of meaning that only
concrete thought can provide. We may now add film
as a mode of languaging that will enable us to do the
same thing.
Shyamalan captures the crisis of meaning in our
current time in his newest film Signs. Where The
Sixth Sense and Unbreakable taught us something of
what meaning is, Signs wrestles with the question of
whether life has any meaning at all. In the movie, a
minister (played by Mel Gibson) who has lost his
faith because of his wife’s death relates her last
words to his brother, Merrill:
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I never told you the last words that Colleen
said before they let her die. She said, “See.”
Then her eyes glazed a bit. And then she
said, “Swing away.” Know why she said
that? Because the nerve endings in her brain
were firing as she died, and some random
memory of us at one of your baseball games
just popped into her head. There is no one
watching out for us, Merrill. We are all on
our own.
The Mel Gibson character will later find out that his
wife’s final words to him were not simply the random
firing of neurons in her dying brain but a prophetic
revelation he will need to save his son’s life. He will
learn that there are, indeed, no coincidences, that
everything in life has meaning. At the film’s end, he
has returned to his faith.
The New Literacy
A final note: though film uses language to
communicate, the best film makers are relying
increasingly on pure form in image and sound to
communicate meaning that is experientially concrete
yet rationally clear. This emerging (or perhaps
reemerging) mode of knowing is a rising new literacy
that our educational institutions will have to foster.
Prior to the invention of the printing press, the
majority of people did not have to learn how to read.
Life was dependent for most on farming skills.
Technology redefined the need for literacy.
Computers did the same thing when they became
“personal” and “desktop.” Computer literacy took
only a decade or so to flood the national curriculum.
Film and television, however, have been with us for
100 and 50 years respectively. We have assumed for
too long that, just because they can be watched
without learning their language, no literacy is needed.
Such is not the case, and, as we turn increasingly
from reading to film, television, and visually based
computer screens, our need for education in film
literacy increases as well.

